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Most of the risk models for ship-grounding accidents do not fully utilize available evidence, since it is
based on accident statistics and expert opinions. The major issue with such kinds of models is their lim-
itation in supporting the process of risk-management with respect to grounding accidents, since they do
not reflect the reality to the extent required. This paper presents an evidence-based and expert-supported
approach to structure a model assessing the probability of ship-grounding accidents, to make it more
suitable for risk-management purposes. The approach focuses on using evidential data of ship-
grounding accidents extracted from the actual accident and incident reports as well as the judgement eli-
cited from the experts regarding the links and probabilities not supported by the reports. The developed
probabilistic model gathers, in a causal fashion, the evidential contributing factors in ship-grounding
accidents. The outcome of the model is the probability of a ship-grounding accident given the prior
and posterior probabilities of the contributing factors. Moreover, the uncertainties associated with the
elements of the model are clearly communicated to the end-user adopting a concept of strength-of-
knowledge. The model can be used to suggest proper risk-control-measures to mitigate the risk. By run-
ning uncertainty and sensitivity analyses of the model, the areas that need more research for making edu-
cated decisions are defined. The model suggests the high-level critical parameters that need proper
control measures are complexity of waterways, traffic situations encountered, and off-coursed ships.
The critical area that calls for more investigation is the onboard presence of a sea-pilot.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
A model of a system is constructed to help the system operators
and decision makers to understand and test the way the system
and its components behave in various circumstances. This is partic-
ularly important for risk managers as they need to predict the
behavior of a system against different controlling measures that
are applied to mitigate the involved risks in the system before
actually implementing them (IMO, 2002). In this respect, what is
truly important for the risk managers as decision makers to know
is ‘‘how accurately the model can mimic the system’s behavior, and
how trustworthy the results of the model could be”. In this respect,
clearly communicating the level of background knowledge (BK)
(see Section 4) that is used to build a model and the uncertainty
attached to that knowledge is valuable and actually recommended
(IMO, 2012; Aven, 2013a; Mazaheri et al., 2014; Montewka et al.,2014b). Evidence-based risk modeling (Fig. 1) is developed to fulfill
such need for more realistic models that are based on real-life sce-
narios and also to communicate the BK that is used to construct the
models (Mazaheri et al., 2015b).
Since, unfortunately, the ship-grounding accidents are not so
rare in the maritime world, for the review of accidents in the Baltic
Sea there is enough evidence at hand to learn from and to use in
risk modeling; see for example Kujala et al. (2009) and
Sormunen et al. (2015b). Due to the seriousness of its conse-
quences and relatively frequent occurrence, these types of acci-
dents are attracting a lot of attention in the academia, industry,
and also among maritime authorities. A number of approaches try-
ing to describe and model ship-grounding accidents are presented
in the scientific literature. For the latest review, the reader is
referred to Li et al. (2012), Özbas (2013), and Mazaheri et al.
(2014). One finding from reviewing the existing models is that
there exists a large variation in the level of usefulness of the mod-
els for decision making, having a risk paradigm in mind. This
means that there is a need for research on models that mimic
Fig. 1. Framework for evidence-based modeling (replicated from Mazaheri et al. (2015b)).
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tions are possible and their effects on the outcome (i.e. the proba-
bility of a grounding of a ship) can be assessed. Second, the use of
models that discover causal relations existing in the modeled sys-
tem and allow two-way reasoning (i.e. from the cause to the effect
and vice versa) may be beneficial. Third, the involved uncertainty
in all sources of data should be clearly addressed, visualized and
presented in the final results. The latter is specifically important
as the issue related to the uncertainty assessment is not much dis-
cussed in the literature of maritime risk analysis (Goerlandt and
Montewka, 2015b; Sormunen et al., 2015a).
As a response to these needs, an evidence-based probabilistic
casual model of ship-grounding accidents is proposed here. Con-
trary to the models that are based purely on expert opinion and
thus merely on the intuition of the developers, evidence-based
models are supported by real-life scenarios; and the presented
BK in such models is assumed stronger (Kristiansen, 2010,
Mazaheri et al., 2014). A root cause analysis of the marine acci-
dents in the Arctic region using real accident/incident cases by
Kum and Sahin (2015), and quite the same approach for the Shen-
zhen estuarine waters by Chen et al. (2015) are also recent exam-
ples of the response to the need for using real scenarios to mimic
the behavior of real systems in modeling. However, an important
part of modeling is visualization and communication of the
strength of the BK (Goerlandt and Reniers, 2016). This is essential
when a risk model is used for decision making and the BK level is
weak, thus the uncertainty is high. Such situation may result in risk
estimates that falls in the acceptable level, whereas the associated
uncertainty may be larger than the margin between risk level and
acceptance boundaries, finally resulting in a situation where the
risk shall not be deemed acceptable (Montewka et al., 2014b;
Aven, 2015). Additionally, the strength of BK is important when
assessing the effectiveness of risk control options (RCOs) and the
residual risk in the system after implementing the RCOs. Thus, this
issue is an additional feature also covered here of the evidence-
based modeling.The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to demonstrate how
the collected evidence from the real-life scenarios as accident and
incident reports can be used to construct an evidential, probabilis-
tic causal risk model for assessing the probability and contributing
factors of such an undesirable phenomena as ship grounding acci-
dent. Second, to evaluate the strength of the BK used to develop the
model and to communicate it effectively to the end-users to make
risk-informed decisions.
To reach the above goal, the remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as follow: the grounding model and the methodology that
is used to develop it are presented in Section 2. The model valida-
tion process is explained in Section 3. A method evaluating the
strength of the BK is proposed in Section 4. The model and its
results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model and its development methodology
Considering maritime transportation as a system, a well-
defined approach by Haimes (2009) and Aven (2011) can be fol-
lowed for defining the risk of the system. In that approach, the risk
of the system can be defined as R ¼ fS; L;Cg, where S is the scenario
for a mishap to occur, L is the likelihood of that specific scenario to
occur, and C is the consequence of that specific scenario if it occurs.
However, since our knowledge of the system is never complete, the
system can never be characterized exactly (Aven and Zio, 2011).
Therefore, what we will describe as the risk for a given system,
at the end will be formulated merely based on our best knowledge
about the system. This incompleteness, which is rooted in our lack
of BK on the given system, should always be recognized and com-
municated. Therefore, the amount of available BK about the system
should additionally be considered in the definition of risk. As the
result, the description of risk perspective for the given system
can yield R  fS; L;CjBKg (Mazaheri et al., 2014).
Probabilistic causal modeling is known as one of the most suit-
able methods for modeling the risk of complex systems with high
uncertainty like maritime transportation system (Goerlandt and
Fig. 2. Maritime transportation as a complex socio-technical system.
1 Here, an incident refers to an individual mishap or a series of mishaps that did not
result in a serious accident like ship-grounding with consequences on human life or
the environment, while accident refers to an individual mishap or a series of mishaps
that result in an event with minor or major consequences on human life or the
environment or causes financial loss.
2 The Finnish organization responsible for pilotage tasks in Finnish territorial
waters.
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Zhang et al., 2013). Therefore, we adopt here a stepwise approach
for constructing a probabilistic causal model, as follows:
1. Define the system with its characteristics and boundaries
2. Collect the required data
3. Develop the model’s structure
4. Parameterize the model
5. Validate the model
The approach is proposed by Kragt (2009) and further modified
by Akhtar and Utne (2014) to account for the specificity of mar-
itime accidents. Finally, the knowledge extracted from the ship-
grounding accident and incident reports (Mazaheri et al., 2015b)
is used to develop an evidence-based probabilistic causal model
for ship-grounding accidents.
The utilized framework is quite similar to what Montewka et al.
(2014a) suggested for risk assessment of maritime transportation
systems. In general, the framework suggests to first define what
to model and the variables to include, then to develop the qualita-
tive and quantitative parts of the model respectively, and finally to
validate the model.
2.1. System definition
The system under the study is marine transportation system.
The observable phenomenon within the system is ship-
grounding accident that involves the impact of a ship on seabed
or on the side of a waterway, due to involvement of various
parameters. Therefore, the characteristics and boundaries of
the phenomenon under the study can be defined using the
superior system as maritime transportation. Since humans are
still an important and unavoidable element of such system,
maritime transportation is considered as a complex socio-
technical system (Woods, 1988). Such system can be defined
by four main elements: the environment of the system, which
affects the second and third elements of the system, i.e. the
current state and the operators, and the fourth element, namely
the interface of the system, where the other three elements
interact (Fig. 2). A phenomenon like ship-grounding happens
within the interface of the system, which thus is affected by
the other three elements of the system. Therefore, a number
of theoretical parameters from each element of the main sys-
tem can be listed as factors affecting the grounding accident.
Examples of such factors are meteorological and traffic condi-
tions, waterway particulars, human and organizational elements,
and the specific particulars of the ship herself. Nevertheless,
adoption of parameters that are commonly believed in but
which are not based on evidence should be made with caution;
since those parameters can be anything presented in support of
an assertion and thus would require an uncertainty ranking
score. Caution should be applied for the sake of model credibil-
ity, its complexity, and the involved uncertainty, both in the
model itself and in its outcomes. This issue is further clarified
in the following sections as data collection and model
construction.
2.2. Data collection
After defining the system, one needs to collect the required
data for the modeling. For an evidence-based modeling approach,
one of the available sources is the accident reports that are pre-
pared by expert accident investigators (Schröder-Hinrichs et al.,
2011). The richness of the accident reports regarding the informa-
tion about the existing threats as well as the easy accessibility
have made the accident reports a desirable source of data andinformation that are based on evidence (Celik and Cebi, 2009,
Kristiansen, 2010, Akhtar and Utne, 2014; Mazaheri et al.,
2015b). However, despite of all the advantages, using only acci-
dent reports for modeling has its own disadvantages. One is that
not all the accidents are investigated by the authorities; often
only those that may enhance safety awareness among the mar-
itime society are investigated (SIAF, 2014). Therefore, the number
of scenarios that can be caught by using accident reports are lim-
ited. The other is that, fortunately, accidents are quite rare: this
further limits the number of scenarios that can be analyzed
(Ladan and Hänninen, 2012). To overcome such downsides, one
of the suggested solutions is to utilize incident reports, as inci-
dents1 take place much more frequently than accidents (Bole
et al. 1987). Besides, since incidents are governed by mechanisms
and underlying parameters similar to those that cause accidents
(Harrald et al. 1998) but do not end up in actual accidents, inci-
dents could be used as an additional source of data which may give
insights about the in-placed risk control options that stopped the
incident from becoming an accident. Nevertheless, unlike the acci-
dents reports, incident reports are not freely and easily available
(Ladan and Hänninen 2012). Moreover, the way that such incidents
are investigated affects the quality and thus the reliability of the
embedded information.
A recent study by the authors showed that, unlike the manda-
tory incident reports that are requested and prepared by some
companies and authorities, voluntarily incident reports may not
be reliable enough to be used for evidence-based risk modeling
(Mazaheri et al. 2015b). Therefore, for this study we have only used
mandatory incident reports in addition to the accident reports. We
have utilized 115 grounding accident reports from the Finnish and
British authorities and 90 incident reports from the Finnpilot2 inci-
dent database, which is a mandatory-to-fill database of incidents
reported by the Finnish pilots.
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To develop a grounding model presented here, accident reports
are reviewed using the Human Factor Analysis and Classification
for Grounding (HFACS-Ground) taxonomy introduced by
Mazaheri and Montewka (2014) and Mazaheri et al. (2015b). The
incident reports are reviewed using the Safety Factor (SF) taxon-
omy introduced by Nisula (2014) and Mazaheri et al. (2015b). In
the reviewing process of the accident reports, a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) is structured for every reviewed accident based on
the provided factual information in the report to demonstrate the
relation of the contributing parameters in the accident. Therefore,
practically for every reviewed accident, in addition to the extracted
information using the HFACS-Ground, a DAG is also structured.
Finally, all the DAGs are aggregated into a qualitative DAG reflect-
ing the cumulated information from the reviewing of the reports.
Due to the shortness and non-comprehensiveness of incident
reports, the same procedure is not followed with them. Instead,
they are reviewed by using SFs that are high-level positive func-
tions and are believed to be prerequisite for safe transport opera-
tions. The SFs are defined with three principles in mind: 1-the
factors need to be positive functions and not failure conditions or
technical devices; 2-the set should cover all high-level safety–crit-
ical functions; and 3-overlap among the SFs should be avoided. In
this way, SFs provide an approximation of the real system func-
tions and do not go in-depth compared with other methods like
HFACS. Besides, the positive nature of the SFs, as opposed to the
failure condition taxonomies used in methods like HFACS, helps
to look for the measures that were present in the incident scenar-
ios and presumably stopped the situation to become an accident
(Hollnagel, 2015). These features of SFs provide a suitable platform
with a proper taxonomy for analyzing incident reports that are not
prepared in a systematic analytical way. Therefore, the contribut-
ing factors on the incidents as well as the in-placed control mea-
sures that stopped the incidents to become accidents are
gathered and cumulated using the SFs taxonomy. Thereafter, since
the accident and incident reports are reviewed using different
approaches, in order to be able to combine the BK, the results are
transferred into a common terminology using general categories
that are based on failure terminology. Categories from Rothbaum
(2000) and McCafferty and Baker (2006) are used as guidelines in
building the general categories for this part. In order to decrease
the amount of information loss resulting from the accumulation
process, the general categories are defined dynamically, i.e. when
all the extracted contributing factors from the reports are at hand,
they are assigned to pre-created categories. In case that some con-
tributing factors cannot be fit to an existing category or a change to
the taxonomy of an existing category is needed in order to accom-
modate a contributing factor, a new category is created. When a
new category is created, all the contributing factors are checked
again to see if the new category can be a better fit for any of the
previously assigned contributing factors. For a thorough explana-
tion of the data collection and the procedures, the reader is
referred to our earlier work reported in Mazaheri et al. (2015b).
2.4. Model construction
The third step in the framework is the setting up a qualitative
causal model. In Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) modeling, this step
refers to choosing the relevant parameters for the model as nodes
as well as the way those nodes are interconnected, that is, the links
between the parameters as edges. This was an iterative process.
The variables that are extracted as the contributing parameters
in the reviewed accident/incident reports in the previous step form
the initial nodes of the model. Initially, all the nodes are given two
states: the presence or absence of the contributing parameter. Thisis a simple and safe way to discretize the variables when they are
supported by the reports; each report only expresses whether a
parameter was present at the time of the accident/incident or
whether it was absent. However, during the iteration process and
during the parameterization phase (see the next section, ‘‘Model
Parameterization”), the states of the nodes are adjusted whenmore
information is obtained. For instance, the node ‘‘Authority Gradi-
ent” (see Fig. 3 and Table A1) was initially given the states ‘‘exist”
and ‘‘not exist”; however, it was later discovered from the reports
that the ‘‘Authority Gradient” can have three states: ‘‘Steep”,
‘‘Negative” and ‘‘Optimal”. The first means that the decision of a
higher rank officer surpasses all the others’ opinions on the bridge.
The second refers to situations where the decision of a higher rank
officer is always affected by the others’ opinions. The third state
occurs when other possible opinions on the bridge are also heard
and the decision is made by the superior considering the heard
opinions. Another example is the node ‘‘Meteorological Condition”
(see Fig. 3 and Table A1), which initially had two states: ‘‘Good”
and ‘‘Bad”. However, when it appeared that this variable can affect
the vision of the officer on watch (‘‘Visibility”) as well as the nav-
igational equipment (‘‘Signal Quality”), the states were changed to
‘‘Storm” that can affect the ‘‘Signal Quality”, ‘‘Fog” that can affect
the ‘‘Visibility”, and ‘‘Good” for a normal situation (DNV, 2003;
Hänninen et al., 2014). This way of discretization is performed
purely based on the evidence at hand, and other sort of discretiza-
tion that might be regarded as rather arbitrary is avoided at this
study. It might be thought that the model can be more accurate
if finer discretization (i.e. more states for a variable) or even a con-
tinuous distribution were used for some of the variables; neverthe-
less, one should bear in mind that larger databases with more data
are needed if either of the above methods should be utilized to evi-
dentially support finer discretization; a greater number of variable
states means more complex and larger conditional probabilities
that need to be obtained.
After defining the contributing parameters as the nodes and
their states, a link has been made between every two parameters
that are statistically dependent. The approach taken to determine
statistical dependence is described in the Appendix.
Thereafter, the resulting network is iteratively cross-checked
with the individual DAGs of the accidents that are structured in
the previous phase in order to define the direction of the added
links as well as to retrieve the parameters and connections that
may have been lost during the combination process. The combina-
tion process is a process in which the individual parameters are
accumulated into the global parameters used in HFACS-Ground
and SF. As the result, every node and link in the final model is sup-
ported either by at least two accident reports or by statistical
dependencies; (see Appendix and Table A1). Four nodes and their
links (i.e. Waterway Complexity, Location, Season, and Traffic Distri-
bution) are supported by the statistical analysis performed earlier
by the authors on HELCOM grounding accident data between the
years 1989–2010 (Mazaheri et al., 2015a). The Traffic Distribution
node is additionally supported by the data from the reviewed acci-
dent report (see Table A1). The resulting model has 32 nodes
(excluding the Grounding node) as contributing factors on the
grounding accident. The nodes are interconnected with 49 edges,
including the links to the Grounding node (Fig. 3).
2.5. Model parameterization
After constructing the qualitative model, the fourth step is to
quantify the model, that is, fill the prior and posterior probabilities
of the nodes.
In principle, there are two common practices to fill the condi-
tional probability tables (CPTs) of a BBN. These practices are not
necessarily exclusive, but each has its own uncertainties involved.
Fig. 3. An evidence-based BBN model for grounding accidents. The probabilities shown as bar charts represent the conditional probability of each node.
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experts’ opinions on the likelihood of the occurrence of each sce-
nario defined by the model, see for example DNV (2003), Cooke
and Goossens (2004), O’Hagan et al. (2006), Goossens et al.
(2008), and Hänninen et al. (2014). Another way is to use the sta-
tistical data and try to find the statistics related to each scenario
represented by the constructed model. However, there are several
issues that need to be considered when one wishes to use the sta-
tistical data. First, there is the fact of accidents’ under-reporting.
Based on studies regarding the under-reporting phenomena in
the maritime realm (Thomas and Skjong, 2009, Psarros et al.,
2010; Hassel et al., 2011), one can judge the related uncertainty
and thus it can be compensated.
Second, not all the accidents are investigated. According to the
Safety Investigation Authority of Finland, not all the reported acci-
dents to the authority are investigated (SIAF, 2014). Therefore,
using the accident reports as the statistics for estimating the CPTs
can under- or overestimate the probabilities, which translates to
uncertainty. Unfortunately, the studies for under-investigated
cases do not exist, thus the related uncertainty remains unknown.Third, each chain of events leading to an accident is different.
The ships involved, crew, external and internal conditions, the sit-
uational context – in each accident these are different. This means
that the exchangeability of events, which is a prerequisite for the
frequency assessment, is not valid (Apostolakis, 2014).
Keeping in mind the above discussion and the limitation of the
available data on under-reporting and under-investigation and
taking into account the lack of exchangeability we decided to uti-
lize the experts’ judgment to fill the CPTs of the constructed model.
The CPTs are thus filled using the probabilities presented in the
existing literature that have utilized expert opinions for defining
the conditional probabilities of different scenarios for a grounding
accident (DNV, 2003; Haapasaari et al., 2014; Hänninen et al.,
2014). Additionally, the previous studies of the authors regarding
the statistics of the grounding accidents (Mazaheri et al., 2015a,
b) are used as additional sources. In this regard, if the conditional
probability of a scenario in the constructed model of this study is
recognized in either of the mentioned sources, the probabilities
are filled using the same values presented in the mentioned
sources. However, in case that a scenario in the constructed model
Table 1
Type of validity tests for BBN models adapted from Pitchforth and Mengersen (2013).
Validity type Description
Nomological Confident that the model domain fits within a wider domain established by the literature
Construct validity Face Approval from the domain experts that the model looks as expected
Content Confident that the available information is integrated into the model via the nodes, links, and discretization as well as
parametrization of the nodes
Criterion validity Concurrent Confident that the whole network or sections of it behave identically to sections or another network from a similar
domain
Qualitative
features test
Showing that the model structure, discretization, and parameters are similar to the nomologically proximal models
Behavior
sensitivity test
Approval that the behavior of the model as well as its sensitiveness to the constructed components is what is expected
from the modeled system
Fig. 4. Nomological map for the BBN model of ship-grounding accident.
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sources, the probabilities are filled using scenarios similar to those
detected in our dataset, which is based on the reviewed accident
and incident reports. It means that the probability of the scenario
is represented by the number of occurrences of the scenario in
the dataset divided by the total number of the reviewed cases (pre-
sented in Table A1 in the Appendix as ‘‘205 A&I”). A factor of 2, sup-
ported by the results of Psarros et al. (2010) and Hassel et al.
(2011), is utilized to adjust the number of the accident cases to
ease the uncertainty effect from under-reporting. Nevertheless,
the under-investigated uncertainty is not addressed in estimating
the probabilities. As the result, 1065 prior and posterior probabil-
ities are estimated and fed into the model for its quantification.
3. Model validation
Validation of a model means finding whether the built model
actually fulfills the purpose for which it was built, given that it con-
fers the specification of the system that it is representing
(Marwedel, 2011; Wentworth, 2012).
Model validation can be understood in a wider sense than as a
comparison with observed data, by inspecting the model qua
model. Such approaches to validation are widely used in social
science research (Trochim and Donnely, 2008), system dynamicsmodeling (Forrester and Senge, 1980), expert-based Bayesian Net-
work modeling (Pitchforth and Mengersen, 2013) and recently in
the maritime risk modeling (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2014;
Goerlandt et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015). A fairly similar holistic
validity framework with six types of validity tests is adopted here,
as presented in Table 1.
First, it is possible to evaluate whether the model adequately
operationalizes the construct it intends to measure, i.e. how well
it concretizes the object of inquiry for the given purpose. This is
evaluated in terms of nomological and construct validities. The lat-
ter is broken down into face and content validities. Face validity is
a subjective, heuristic interpretation of whether the model is an
appropriate operationalization of the construct. Content validity
is a more detailed comparison of the elements in the risk model
in relation to what is believed to be relevant in the real system.
Second, a number of specific tests can be performed on the
model to evaluate whether the model adequately meets certain
criteria. Here we refer to criterion validity. A Behavior Sensitivity
Test (BST) is used to assess to which model elements the results
are sensitive. Parameter sensitivity of a model can be calculated
and the results can be evaluated by domain experts. In a qualitative
features test (QFT), the model response is evaluated for a number
of test conditions in terms of a qualitative understanding of how
the system is believed to respond under these conditions. In a
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the elements in another model for a similar purpose. This can also
include a comparison with the output of such a model if the scope
of the applications is the same.
The validity tests do not ‘‘prove” that the model results are cor-
rect; they only indicate the extent to which the model is a plausible
representation of the object of inquiry. The model should be plau-
sible enough to serve as a basis for further reflections, leading to
deliberative judgments in the risk analysis (Goerlandt and
Montewka, 2015a; Zhang et al., 2015).
3.1. Nomological validity
Nomological validity discusses the position of the constructed
model within similar existing models in the context of the studied
phenomena, which here is ship-grounding accident. This type of
validity needs extensive literature analysis to find and understand
the existing models in the realm under the study (Pitchforth et al.,
2014). In this way, a nomological map is drawn to estimate the dis-
tance of the constructed model from the existing models in four
areas of uncertainty in BBN modeling, as follows (Pitchforth
et al., 2014):
1- Structure of the model, which includes the nodes that are
included in the model as well as the way those nodes are
interconnected (i.e. the edges).
2- Discretization, which is about the way the states of each
node are defined.
3- Parametrization that defines the conditional probabilities of
the nodes and their states.
4- Behavior of the model, which describes the uncertainties
related to the output of the model.
The distance for each analyzed pair of models is indicative only,
showing the position of the model among other solutions, for four
analyzed areas (see Fig. 4). To determine the distance, subjective
judgment is used (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015). An extensive
literature analysis (Mazaheri et al., 2014) has detected three prac-
tical BBN models currently existing for ship-grounding accidents.Table 2
Existing BBN models for ship-grounding accidents detected in the literature analysis
and comparable BBN models in other domains.
No. Nodes Edges Source Domain
0 33 49 The current
model
Transportation/maritime/grounding
1 69 107 DNV (2003) Transportation/maritime/grounding
2 75 136 Hänninen
et al. (2014)
Transportation/maritime/grounding
3 35 48 Rambøll
(2006)
Transportation/maritime/grounding
4 16 27 Wang et al.
(2013)
Transportation/maritime/collision
5 62 85 Ancel et al.
(2015)
Transportation/aviation
6 18 30 Oña et al.
(2011)
Transportation/road
Table 3
Output of the proximal grounding BBN models as probability of grounding (PG)
compared with the current model’s output.
Source Current
model
DNV
(2003)
Hänninen et al. (2014)
Output of the model as PG 1.62E5 1.04E5 3.37E5The models are listed in Table 2 as no. 1, 2 and 3 together with a
few recent BBN models from other proximal realms. The nomolog-
ical map for the models is shown in Fig. 4. However, due to differ-
ent modeling choices adopted and availability of the models, not
all the pairs can be compared in all uncertainty areas.
Given that the current model and its output as probability of
grounding (see Table 3) can be placed within the existing models
in the literature and observing the distances that the constructed
model in different areas of uncertainty has with the existing mod-
els in the maritime domain (Fig. 4), specifically in the grounding
accident domain, we are confident that our constructed model is
nomologically validated.
3.2. Construct validity
The construct validity of the model comprises face and content
validities described below.
3.2.1. Face validity
Face validity is established through an iteration process,
explained in the model construction section, when the preliminary
established network is iteratively checked with the individual
DAGs from the accident reports. In the iteration process, the added
nodes and edges in the network are all iteratively checked and con-
firmed with the individual DAG of each accident. Any possible dis-
agreements between DAGs of different accidents are assessed and
confirmed by the researchers who are experts in the field of ship
accident modeling. Therefore, and as the result of the utilized
methodology, we are convinced that the involved contributing
parameters as well as the connected links of the constructed model
are validated; thus the face of the final model is validated too.
3.2.2. Content validity
The content validity checks whether the parameters or relation-
ships that are considered as important by the available literature
are included in the model. The contributing parameters in the
model and their relations are directly extracted from the real
grounding scenarios; thus they are supported by evidence. The dis-
cretization of the nodes based here on the extracted information
from the reports covers the entire state space of the extracted con-
tributing parameters without any gap. Additionally, the model is
parametrized using the available expert knowledge as well as all
the available data in hand. Therefore, we are confident that the
content validity of the model is established as is the construct
validity.
3.3. Criterion validity
The criterion validity presented in this section is broken down
into three elements, namely concurrent validity, qualitative feature
and behavior sensitivity tests.
3.3.1. Concurrent validity
This type of validity is about the behavior of the whole model or
a section of it, in comparison with other models developed for a
similar purpose.
The nomological map in Fig. 4 shows that the current model is
fairly close to the identified proximal models in the literature
within the realm of maritime transportation, especially the ones
related to ship grounding accidents. It can also be seen in Fig. 4 that
the distance of the current model from proximal models is increas-
ing when we move from the models in maritime transportation
system towards the models in other modes of transportation. The
only exception is Rambøll (2006) model, which although is from
maritime domain, the structure of the model stands by the dis-
tance from the current model. This, however, is expected as
Fig. 5. Components of the current model and their interactions from a system
perspective.
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cores of the models are different. The core of Rambøll (2006) model
is based on an imaginary geometrical scenarios that are rooted on
the scenarios first defined by Pedersen (1995), while the core of the
current model is based on the interactions between different parts
of the system (see Fig. 5) that themselves are supported by real life
scenarios as evidence.
The accident models in the domain normally consist of the
sections that account for the factors related to 1-hazardous situ-
ation; 2-danger detection; and 3-accident avoidance by evasive
actions. The constructed model has 10 general sections as illus-
trated in Table 4, and all can be fitted within one or two of the
groups of factors for similar models in the domain. For instance,
sections like ergonomic, traffic, location, and technical failures
can all be seen as factors related to hazardous situations; or sec-
tions like safety culture, vigilance, and officer on watch are all
affecting danger detection; and loss of control, officer on watch,
and traffic are sections related to accident avoidance. Sections
with similar functionalities also exist in DNV (2003) and
Hänninen et al. (2014) models, as the most proximal models in
the literature of the same domain. This basically means that all
three models follow the same logic and thus should behave the
same way. If this observation is combined with the output of
the models shown in Table 3, it can assure us that the concurrent
validity of our model is acceptable.
Here we assume that the number of nodes associated with each
section of the model can represent the complexity of the model.Table 4
Main sections in the models with the number of the associated nodes for each section.
Section in the
model
Current model DNV (2003) Hänninen et al.
(2014)
Danger detection 5 19 19
Safety culture 6 19 5
Ergonomic 1 2 2
Vigilance 3 (no tug
assistance)
7 12
Traffic 1 (traffic
distribution)
1 (traffic
intensity)
1 (traffic
intensity)
Location 1 (waterway
complexity)
1 (familiarity of
OOW)
1 (familiarity of
OOW)
Officer on watch 4 10 12
Technical failures 3 3 4
Meteorological
conditions
2 3 3
Loss of control 5 3 6Table 4 shows that almost all the sections in the constructed model
are less complex than those of the compared models, and thus the
whole model itself is less complex than those of the compared
models. Moreover, the section related to ship traffic in the current
model specifically considers traffic distribution, contrary to other
two models that consider traffic intensity. This is supported by evi-
dence, as reported in Mazaheri et al. (2015a), that shows the
grounding frequency being more dependent on traffic distribution
(with respect to a hypothetical central line of a waterway) than on
traffic density alone. Additionally, the location sections in DNV
(2003) and Hänninen et al. (2014) models only cover the familiar-
ity of the officer-on-watch (OOW) with the waterway, while the
same section in the current model covers the waterway’s complex-
ity that itself depends on many factors such as draft and speed of
the vessel, width of the waterway, number of turns and their mag-
nitude as well as the markings in the waterway (Mazaheri et al.,
2015a).
3.3.2. Qualitative feature test
Qualitative features test (QFT) evaluates a model for a number
of test conditions to check the model response with the actual
understanding of the system behavior under these conditions.
We observed the probability of grounding (i.e. Ground-
ing = ‘‘yes”) while setting each state of each variable in a turn.
The difference in the probability of grounding for a state producing
the largest probability and a state corresponding to the smallest
probability is recorded for each variable (Table A2). The difference
(DPG) will inform us about the behavior of the model and will help
to evaluate the most influential variables:
DPG ¼max PðGrounding ¼ \yes"jX ¼ xiÞ min PðGrounding
¼ \yes"jX ¼ xjÞ;
where xi and xj are the states of variable X that produce the largest
and smallest grounding probabilities, respectively. This difference
describes the maximum change that variable X could cause on the
model output.
The results of this analysis (see Fig. 6 and Table A2) show that
there are two variables producing the largest changes in the model
output if they are set to either of their states. These are ‘‘Being off
Course” and ‘‘Loss of Control”, which seems to follow the expecta-
tion regarding the system under analyzed and some other similar
systems; see for example Hänninen and Kujala (2012), Hänninen
et al. (2012, 2014).
3.3.3. Behavior sensitivity test
Behavior Sensitivity Test (BST) confirms if the model correctly
predicts the behavior of the system that is modeled. The test basi-
cally checks the sensitivity of the model to see if the model is sen-
sitive to the parameters and scenarios that the system itself is also
expected to be sensitive to.
The sensitivity analysis tool of the GeNIeTM software from the
Decision Systems Laboratory of University of Pittsburgh is uti-
lized to perform one-way sensitivity analysis, as described in
Castillo et al. (1997) and Kjaerulff and van der Gaag (2013).
First, the sensitivity function is developed, defining the output
probability of interest as a function of the parameter Y; see
for example Coupé and van der Gaag (2002); van der Gaag
et al. (2007):
f ðYÞ ¼ ðc1Y þ c2Þ=ðc3Y þ c4Þ
where f(Y) is the output probability of interest given observations,
and c1. . .4 are the constants, which are identified based on the
model. Parameter Y is calculated as follows:
Y ¼ pðX ¼ xijpÞ;
Fig. 6. The top 15 variables producing the largest difference in grounding probability when at their worst state (producing the largest PG) and best state (producing the
smallest PG).
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states for X’s parent nodes. When the value of Y is being varied, the
other states of the same parameter X; p(X = xj|p), j – i; should also
be varied in order to keep the probability of the sum of the states
related to X equal to one (Hänninen and Kujala, 2012).
The first derivative of the sensitivity function f(Y) describes the
effect of minor changes in a variable on the output and is called the
sensitivity value.
We have analyzed the sensitivity to changes in the posterior
probabilities for the following:
 A case where the ‘‘Grounding” node is set as a target.
 A case where the ‘‘Being off Course” and ‘‘Loss of Control” nodes
are set as the target nodes. With respect to these two nodes, the
model is at its most sensitive, as detected by the previous
method.
When the target node is set as ‘‘Grounding”, there are no evi-
dent dominating variables in the model; see Fig. 7. This supports
the statement about the complexity of the topic analyzed. On the
other hand, the uncertainties associated with the parameters of
such complex model affect the model output to a lesser extent.
For this reason, such insensitiveness of the model to the changes
of the parameters is desirable, as argued by Henrion et al. (2013)
and Pradhan et al. (1996).
However, when the target nodes are set to ‘‘Being off Course”
and ‘‘Loss of Control”, it becomes evident that the model is sensi-
tive to several nodes, including ‘‘Traffic distribution”, ‘‘Technicalfailure”, ‘‘Detection”, ‘‘Lack of training” or ‘‘Incapacitated”; see
Fig. 8. Such analysis allows for more detailed assessment of the
grounding model and its most sensitive elements.
Evaluating the results of the conducted sensitivity analyses
shows that the model sensitiveness to the different parameters
of the model and to different combinations of parental states (i.e.
scenarios) is in accordance with the expectations of the modeled
system. As the result, we are convinced that the final validity test
as BST is confidently established so as the criterion validity.
4. The strength of background knowledge
The BK is understood here as a mixture of knowledge, under-
standing, beliefs and acceptance about the analyzed phenomena;
for detailed discussion on this concept the reader is referred to
Aven (2013a) and Montewka et al. (2014b). A strong BK will result
in a low level of uncertainty, and, intuitively, weak BK causes a
high level of uncertainty. In this way, the uncertainty level of the
model and its components can be easily communicated to the
end-users of the model.
The adopted concept, which originates from the earlier work of
Aven (2013b) and is applied by others in the maritime field
(Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015a; ValdezBanda et al., 2015),
seems the best-suited for our purpose. Assigned to the model
parameters, there are three levels of uncertainty based on the
amount and quality of the BK that was available as evidence for
this particular parameter at the time of the model construction
(Table 5).
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis of the model by setting the grounding as the target node. The model’s output as probability of grounding is almost insensitive to all parameters of
the model except the Grounding node.
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parameter (i.e. node) and its parental relations (i.e. edges) of the
current model as well as the implemented probabilities based on
the sources of evidence that are utilized to support the existence
of the parameter or the link in the model (see Table A1). The colors
of the border of the nodes show how certain the model makers are
regarding the existence of the parameter in the model and the role
that the parameter plays in the modeled phenomena. The color of
the center of the nodes shows the uncertainty of the implemented
prior and posterior probabilities according to the discussion in the
model quantification section. Likewise, the colors of the arrows
show the certainty of the model makers on the existence of the
presented parental relation between the parameters. Therefore,
based on the presented strength of the knowledge map of the
model (Fig. 9), the outcome of the model can be assessed for the
scenarios of interest that are studied as the risk of the system. This
basically means that if a certain scenario is being studied, the
model can only be used reliably to assess that scenario if the nodes
and links that are involved in that scenario have an acceptablelevel of knowledge strength. Otherwise, the model should not be
used for analyzing that specific scenario, or, if it is, the results
should be used with caution. The level of acceptability should,
however, be decided by the decision maker and according to its
utility value (Grabowski et al., 2000).5. Discussion
In general, it can be argued that the current model stands above
the current state of the art. Tables 2 and 4 compare the complexity
of the evidence-based model with other existing models. They
show that the current model is structurally simpler, with fewer
nodes and edges. This makes it easier for the decision makers to
understand its mechanism. Moreover, Table 3 shows that the out-
put of the model is not that different from the current beliefs of the
domain experts: it has close to the same magnitude of grounding
probability as the other two models that are based purely on
expert opinions. What makes the model outstanding is its
Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis of the model by setting ‘‘Being off Course” and ”Loss of Control” as target nodes.
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evaluation of the effect of high-level interventions that are feasible
in real life and their quantification on the model outcome. For
instance, the model is able to specify the parameters which affect
the outcome the most and estimate the required change in order
to reach a predefined level of grounding probability (diagnostic
reasoning). Alternatively, the model is able to quantify the ground-
ing probability given a set of input parameters (predictive reason-
ing). Also, the model encompasses the high-level parameters
which are of technical, environmental, personal, and organiza-
tional origin. By determining the required change in the probabil-
ities of high-level elements of the model, a more detailed approach
can be taken to judge more detailed action. This means that the
model could in principle be coupled with other models, e.g. those
evaluating the human error or providing the probabilities of tech-
nical failure at a lower level of details.All these are major features of a model that is useful for risk
management; that is, the model should be able to suggest and clar-
ify the measures that need to be taken in order to mitigate the risk
of accident, in this case ship-grounding (European Transport Safety
Council, 2001; Mazaheri et al., 2014). Table 6 is resulted from the
developed model and is in line with the above requirement. Table 6
sorts the parameters and their states, based on the magnitude of
change in every state of each parameter in order to result in zero
probability of grounding. This is obtained by setting the probability
of grounding to zero [P(Grounding = YES) = 0] and back-propagating the
effect into the model to find the behavior of each parameter in the
circumstance.
From Table 6, a decision maker can understand that any risk
control option should primarily be focused on developing mea-
sures to decrease the likelihood of ‘‘going off course” as well as
easing the ‘‘waterway complexity” and possibility of ‘‘traffic
Table 5
The guideline employed for categorizing the strength of the evidence.
Level of knowledge
strength
At least two of the following conditions are met
HIGH High number of supporting cases as evidence (normally
more than 9 cases)
High reliability of the data/information sources used
High detected statistical dependencies
High accuracy of the method used for the data analysis
High acceptance of the data sources used among the
domain experts
MEDIUM Conditions between the characteristics of the high and
low strength knowledge
LOW Low number of supporting cases as evidence (normally
fewer than 4 cases)
Low reliability of the data/information sources used
Low detected statistical dependencies
Low accuracy of the method used for the data analysis
Low acceptance of the data sources used among the
domain
Fig. 9. Strength of the knowledge map of the model (green: strong, orange: medium, red
(as the color of the border of the node) and edge (as the color of the link) as well as the co
the sources of the evidence presented in Table 1.
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ing at Table 6 a decision maker can instantly see where more
information is needed in order to make a more educated decision.
The criticality of each parameter (last column in Table 6), which
cross-checks the importance of the parameter with the uncer-
tainty of that parameter, indicates the parameters that need more
study in order to be fully understood. For instance, the exact
parameters and interrelations that affect the ‘‘waterway complex-
ity” node, as discussed in Mazaheri et al. (2015a), are still to some
degree unclear to the maritime society; or, as also discussed in
Mazaheri et al. (2015b), the positive effect of ‘‘pilot presence”
onboard the ships on the probability of grounding can be ques-
tioned in some circumstances. Uncertainties as such call for more
studies in this regard for discovering the parameters that should
be manipulated in order to decrease the likelihood of a grounding
accident.: weak) shows the uncertainty (green: low, orange: medium, red: high) of each node
nditional probabilities of each node (as the color of the center of the node) based on
Table 6
Criticality of the parameters of the model when probability of grounding is set to zero [P(Grounding = Yes) = 0] with regard to their
strength of knowledge and the magnitude of change in their probabilities (S = strong, H = high, M = medium, W = weak, L = low).
Parameter (X) State (xi) δ P(xi) 
Strength of Knowledge
CriticalityNode Parental Prob.
Being off course <either> 1.00E-05 S S W H 
Traffic Distribution <either> 5.18E-06 S W M H 
Waterway Complexity Easy 2.12E-06 S M M H 
Pilot presence <either> 2.04E-06 M W S H 
Location <either> 2.04E-06 S - S M 
Pilot vigilance <either> 1.85E-06 M S S M 
Waterway Complexity Manageable 1.72E-06 S M M M 
Navigational Error <either> 1.32E-06 S M W M 
Situational awareness No 1.22E-06 S S W M 
Situational awareness Fully 1.16E-06 S S W M 
Visibility <either> 1.02E-06 M M S M 
Loss of control No 8.68E-07 W S S M 
Lack of training <either> 8.21E-07 M W W M 
Meteorological condition Good 7.90E-07 M - S M 
Meteorological condition Fog 6.60E-07 M - S M 
Loss of control Partial 5.23E-07 W S S M 
Waterway Complexity Difficult 4.01E-07 S M M M 
Signal Quality <either> 2.44E-07 W W S M 
Safety culture <either> 1.67E-07 M - W M 
Season <either> 1.46E-06 S - S L 
Detection <either> 1.41E-06 M S S L 
Competence <either> 5.03E-07 M S S L 
Loss of control Total 3.45E-07 W S S L 
Voyage preparation <either> 2.73E-07 S S S L 
Communication, cooperation, 
monitoring
<either> 1.51E-07 S S S L 
Meteorological condition Storm 1.30E-07 M - S L 
Navigation method <either> 9.92E-08 M S W L 
BRM <either> 5.50E-08 M S S L 
Situational awareness Partial 5.41E-08 S S W L 
Technical Redundancy <either> 4.88E-08 W S W L 
Adequate alarm <either> 4.81E-08 S S W L 
Maintenance routine <either> 4.52E-08 W S S L 
Manning <either> 3.76E-08 S S S L 
Cumulated tasks <either> 2.71E-08 M S S L 
Authority gradient Optimal 2.31E-08 W - W L 
Authority gradient Steep 2.06E-08 W - W L 
VTS <either> 2.03E-08 M - S L 
Bridge design Inadequate 1.04E-08 M - S L 
Bridge design Conventional 9.00E-09 M - S L 
Authority gradient Negative 2.52E-09 W - W L 
Sudden Situational Change <either> 2.45E-09 M - W L 
Bridge design Solo 1.41E-09 M - S L 
Technical failure <either> 7.48E-10 W S S L 
Incapacitated <either> 4.72E-10 M - S L 
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ism, as presented by Kaplan (1997), that helps the decision makers
to decide whether they should accept the resulting risk or not.
According to Aven (2013b), the strength of knowledge can help
the decision makers to decide whether to accept the risk or not
only if the calculated risk by the utilized risk model is acceptable
for them. Since not all of the decision makers have the same prior-
ities and not even the same degree of feeling about the risk, they
have different utility values (Merrick and van Dorp, 2006). Themodel presented here attempts to help the decision makers to effi-
ciently maximize their own utility values by communicating the
level of the BK of the whole model.
Nevertheless, the presented model and its results should not be
used without caution. The included parameters do not cover the
whole space of the state of the studied system. This is unfortunate
but unavoidable as the model is built only based on the evidential
data at hand, which beside all issues mentioned earlier is limited
temporarily and geographically. Nevertheless, because of the clear
208 A. Mazaheri et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 195–210communication of the imbedded knowledge into the model, the
model has the ability to be developed further by implementing
more data in order to cover a larger space of the state of the sys-
tem. Moreover, the coding system used in the data collection and
processing phases was aimed to decrease the subjectivity in the
collected data and information as much as possible. However, it
should be born in mind that the sources of the data, the accident
and incident reports, are still subjective to the understanding of
the experts who prepared and reviewed them. This, however, is
part of the involved epistemic uncertainty that cannot be elimi-
nated, due to them being inherent in the utilized data sources.
With this being said, what makes the model to stand out from
its predecessors is the extensive use of available evidence and clear
communication of the involved uncertainty. This makes it possible
to define the areas of the model that can be improved whenever
more data sources are available. This can be done either by further
supporting the current structure with more evidence in order to
increase the strength of knowledge behind each parameter and
its parental relation, or by modifying the current structure when
more reliable and trustworthy sources of evidence suggest adding
or eliminating a certain parameter or link.6. Conclusion
Lack of an evidence-based approach for ship-grounding model-
ing for building suitable models for risk management purposes was
previously shown by Mazaheri et al. (2014) and further supported
by Mazaheri et al. (2015a). In this paper, using the actual accident
and incident reports of ship-grounding, an evidence-based
approach is suggested for building an evidence-based probabilisticTable A1
The variables included in the final BBN, their parents, and the source of the evidence for eac
No. Parametera (node) Parent nodes’ no. Sources (
Probabili
1 Adequate alarm 12 205 A&I
2 Authority gradient – 205 A&I
3 Being off course 14, 19, 29 205 A&I
4 Bridge design – DNV (20
5 BRMb 22 DNV (20
6 Communication, cooperation, monitoring 2, 5, 7, 30 205 A&I,
7 Competence 12 DNV (20
8 Cumulated tasks 4, 16, 26, 31 DNV (20
9 Detection 24, 27, 30 Hänninen
10 Grounding 3, 33 Mazaher
11 Incapacitated – DNV (20
12 Lack of training 22 205 A&I
13 Location – Hänninen
14 Loss of control 12, 27 DNV (20
15 Maintenance routine 22 Hänninen
16 Manning 22 205 A&I,
17 Meteorological condition – DNV (20
18 Navigational method 31 205 A&I
19 Navigational error 11, 25 205 A&I
20 Pilot presence 13 Hänninen
21 Pilot vigilance 20 DNV (20
22 Safety culture – 205 A&I
23 Season – Haapasaa
24 Signal quality 17 Hänninen
25 Situational awareness 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 21, 32 205 A&I
26 Sudden situational change – 205 A&I
27 Technical failure 15, 28 Hänninen
28 Technical redundancy 22 205 A&I
29 Traffic distribution 23 Mazaher
30 Visibility 4, 17 DNV (20
31 Voyage preparation 6, 20, 22 Hänninen
32 VTSc – Hänninen
33 Waterway complexity 13, 30 Mazaher
a The used terminology is explained in the Appendix of Mazaheri et al. (2015b).
b Bridge resource management.
c Vessel traffic service.causal model for assessing the probability of ship-grounding acci-
dents. The model is believed to be more suitable for risk manage-
ment purposes as it exposes all the background knowledge behind
the construction of the model and thus communicates clearly the
involved uncertainties in the model. Each single node and link in
the model is supported by actual accident reports, which basically
support the integrated scenarios into the model. This has resulted
in a simpler structure of the model compared with other existing
models of this type.
Besides, the model can be used to suggest areas that need to be
controlled by proper risk mitigation measures or areas that need
more study to be fully understood. In this regard, the model sug-
gests that the critical parameters that need proper control mea-
sures are complexity of waterways, traffic encounters, and a ship
being off course. The critical area that calls for more investigation
and study, in addition to the above-mentioned parameters, is the
onboard presence of a sea-pilot.Appendix A
A1. Variables existing in the model and their sources
See Table A1.
A2. Statistical evaluation of dependency between nodes in the
grounding model
For evaluating the statistical dependency between the nodes in
the constructed model, we have assumed a connection between
two nodes exists if they show at least 95% significant level ofh node and parental relations as edges as well as the prior and posterior probabilities.
#A = accident reports, #I = incident reports, # the number of occurrences)
ties Node Parental relations (edges)
15 A 3 A
3 A –
115 A 25 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
03) 6 A –
03) 5 A 3 A, Hänninen et al. (2014)
DNV (2003) 15 A 9 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
03) 6 A 1 A
03) 9 A 18 A
et al. (2014) 7 A 10 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
i et al. (2015a) – 115 A
03) 5 A –
5 A 3 A
et al. (2014) Mazaheri et al. (2015a) –
03) 3 A 6 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
et al. (2014) 2 A 1 A
DNV (2003) 11 A 3 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
03) 5 A –
9 A 4 A
12 A 11 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
et al. (2014) 5 A Haapasaari et al. (2014)
03) 5 A 6 A
9 A –
ri et al. (2014) Mazaheri et al. (2015a) –
et al. (2014) 4 A DNV (2003)
20 A 54 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
5 A –
et al. (2014) 4 A 1 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
2 A Hänninen et al. (2014)
i et al. (2015a) 2 A & Mazaheri et al. (2015a) Mazaheri et al. (2015a)
03) 7 A 3 A
et al. (2014) 10 A 1 A, Mazaheri et al. (2015b)
et al. (2014) 8 A –
i et al. (2015a) Mazaheri et al. (2015a) Mazaheri et al. (2015a)
Table A2
The states producing the largest and smallest grounding probabilities, the corresponding probability values, and their differences for all the parameters of the network.
Parameter X Best state PBestG Worst state P
Worst
G
DPG
Being off course No 5.00E06 Yes 1.07EE04 1.02E04
Loss of control No 1.54E05 Yes 1.14E04 9.86E05
Waterway complexity Easy 1.33E05 Difficult 3.84E05 2.52E05
Traffic distribution Free 1.62E05 Encounter 4.11E05 2.48E05
Navigational error No 7.63E06 Yes 2.93E05 2.16E05
Situational awareness Fully 1.48E05 No 3.39E05 1.91E05
Lack of training No 1.49E05 Yes 3.36E05 1.87E05
Detection Yes 1.54E05 No 2.79E05 1.25E05
Location Open sea 1.46E05 Pilotage area 2.62E05 1.16E05
Pilot presence Present 1.34E05 Absent 2.35E05 1.01E05
Pilot vigilance Able to correct 1.34E05 Not able 2.35E05 1.01E05
Incapacitated Capable 1.62E05 Reduced 2.60E05 9.84E06
Season Winter 1.37E05 Summer 2.32E05 9.47E06
Visibility Good 1.62E05 Poor 2.57E05 9.44E06
Meteorological condition Good 1.20E05 Fog 1.84E05 6.49E06
Competence High 1.48E05 Low 1.97E05 4.95E06
Signal quality Good 1.46E05 Poor 1.94E05 4.80E06
Voyage preparation Properly 1.57E05 Poor 1.98E05 4.12E06
Cumulated tasks No 1.60E05 Yes 2.01E05 4.10E06
Adequate alarm In use 1.57E05 Not in use 1.68E05 1.10E06
Safety culture Good 1.62E05 Poor 1.70E05 7.41E07
Navigational method Advanced 1.56E05 Traditional 1.63E05 7.39E07
Communication, cooperation, monitoring Adequate 1.59E05 Inadequate 1.65E05 6.77E07
Manning Adequate 1.61E05 Inadequate 1.68E05 6.44E07
Technical failure No 1.60E05 Yes 1.66E05 6.26E07
Technical redundancy Redundant 1.62E05 Scarce 1.66E05 3.64E07
BRM Exist 1.62E05 None 1.65E05 3.40E07
Maintenance routine Followed 1.60E05 Not followed 1.63E05 3.33E07
Bridge design Solo 1.62E05 Inadequate 1.64E05 2.23E07
VTS Yes 1.62E05 No 1.63E05 1.18E07
Authority gradient Optimal 1.62E05 Steep 1.63E05 9.75E08
Sudden situational change No 1.62E05 Yes 1.62E05 1.40E08
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posed by Akhtar and Utne (2014). Additionally, since Pearson coef-
ficient can only catch the linear dependency between two variables
(Lehman et al., 2005), the Mutual Information (MI) test is used to
catch the non-linear dependencies between the variables (Steuer
et al., 2002; Peng et al., 2005).
In this regard, using MI test, we have calculated the Uncertainty
Coefficient (UC) between every two variables. UC determines how
large a proportion of the uncertainty about one variable can be
decreased by observing the other variable (Theil, 1970), which
basically expresses how much two variables are dependent. For
this study, every two variables that have UC of more than 10%
are considered dependent, and thus their nodes in the model are
connected via a link.
Setting the threshold of 10% for UC in order to add a link into
the network is justified by knowing that the maximum calculated
UC between the parameters of the model was 29%, with the mean
value of 2% and standard deviation of 4%. Thus, the 10% threshold is
considered as justifiable because it only catches the top 5% of cal-
culated UCs located in the right tail of the distribution of the calcu-
lated UCs. This has ensured us that the links with high level of
uncertainties are avoided in the model.
A3. Results of sensitivity analysis of the model
See Table A2.
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